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COMMENTS
CHALLENGES TO STATE TAKEOVER LAWS:
PREEMPTION AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing regularity corporations are purchasing
each other. To fend off hostile attacks target management has
sought the protections afforded by state takeover laws. These
statutes delay the takeover, often frustrating the attempt, in
contravention of the purposes of the federal rules which view
takeovers as an effective way of removing inefficient manage-
ment. For this reason raiding corporations have sought to
enjoin the enforcement of state takeover laws as being pre-
empted by the federal scheme. Additionally, the raiding cor-
porations protest that the extra-territorial effect of the state
statutes causes an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce. Because of the jurisdictional reach of the state statutes
a raiding corporation is often forced to comply with three or
four state statutes.
The continued validty of the state regulation of corporate
takeovers1 is questionable as two recent court of appeals deci-
1. Thirty-seven states regulate corporate takeovers: ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-
.120 (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264-.14 (Supp. 1980); COLo. REv. STAT. §§
11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-456 to -468 (1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.35-.363 (Supp.
1978) repealed by laws of 1979, c. 79-381 § 13 Sept. 1, 1979; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-
1901 to -1915 (1980); HAWAU REv. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-
1501, 03, 05, 07, 08 (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§
137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1-11 (Bums Supp.
1979); Iowa Uniform Securities Act §§ 502.102, .211-.215 (Supp. 1979), reprinted in
[1979] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) IM 25,101-25,172; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -
1285 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 292-560-.991 (Supp. 1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (Supp.
1980); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (West Supp. 1981); MCH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§
451.901-.917 (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1979); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-1 to -23 (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§
409.500-.565 (Vernon 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :15 (Supp. 1980);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 1600-
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sions have struck down anti-takeover laws in New Jersey2 and
Illinois. s Both of the courts agree that the attempt to regulate
tender offers, as embodied in the statutes in question, was
preempted by the federal regulatory scheme commonly re-
ferred to as the Williams Act.4 This Comment will analyze the
preemption issue as it relates to state anti-takeover laws, es-
pecially in Wisconsin. It will then address those commerce
clause problems closely associated with state regulation. First,
the Comment will describe the setting in which a tender offer
is made to assist in analyzing the conflicting interests in
tender offer regulation with respect to the federal and state
government.
5
II. BACKGROUND OF TENDER OFFER REGULATION
One's view of a hostile cash tender offer0 is in large part
1614 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp. 1980);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page 1979); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-85 (Pur-
don Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1980); S.D. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (Supp.
1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -534 (1980);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Special Pamphlet 1979); Tex. Administrative
Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Tender Offers 065.15.00.100-.800, reprinted in
[1979] 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. (CCH) H1 55,671-55,682.
2. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,731 (3d Cir. Dec. 17, 1980).
3. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)
(1980).
5. See F. Deguire, Address of Frank C. Deguire at the Marquette University Law
School, March 8, 1979: The Pabst Brewing Company Defends a Takeover Attempt
Made by APL Corporation (transcript is on file in the Marquette Law Review). Mr.
Deguire was the Chairman of the Board at Pabst while it successfully defended
against a takeover bid by APL Corporation. Mr. Deguire's remarks are extremely use-
ful as a gauge of corporate management's sentiments towards a hostile takeover.
6. While the Williams Act does not define the term tender offer, several attempts
have been made. See E. AaANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CON-
TROL (1973); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1250, 1251-54 (1973); S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967). The American Law Institute suggests the following
definition:
TENDER OFFER-(A) GENERAL.-'Tender offer' means an offer to buy a
security, or a solicitation of an offer to sell a security, that is directed to more
than thirty-five persons, unless-(i) it (I) is incidental to the execution of a
buy order by a broker, or to a purchase by a dealer, who performs no more
than the usual function of a broker or dealer, or (II) does no more than state
an intention to make such an offer or solicitation; and (ii) it satisfies any addi-
tional conditions that the Commission imposes by rule.
[Vol. 64:657
STATE TAKEOVER LAWS
determined by his position. While incumbent management
views the attempt as a raid (with it as the "target"), the offer-
ing company prefers to use a more neutral description refer-
ring to itself as an "offeror." This language reflects how trau-
matic the takeover experience is for corporate management.7
To fend off the attack incumbent management often attempts
to find a more suitable corporation, referred to as a "white
knight," to effect a takeover. Such a move was made by Har-
nischfeger when faced with a takeover attempt by Paccar.
While both takeovers were eventually unsuccessful, Harnisch-
feger found a company more to its liking, Mannesmann, to
make a more lucrative offer.8
A second, and more effective, method of defense is the ini-
tiation of preventive actions in anticipation of a takeover.
Thus, a corporation makes itself unattractive to a potential
offeror by taking anticipatory defensive measures known as
"shark repellant." Today, the main targets of tender offers are
easily recognizable. Usually one or more of the following con-
ditions exist: stock price lower than book value; a low price to
earnings ratio; a small proportion of stock in officers' and di-
ALI FED. SEC. § 202(166) (1980).
7. See Comment, State Takeover Statutes Versus Congressional Intent: Pre-
empting the Maze, 5 HOFSTA L. REV. 857 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Preempting
the Maze]; F. Deguire, Address of Frank C. Deguire at the Marquette University Law
School, March 8, 1979: The Pabst Brewing Company Defends a Takeover Attempt
Made by APL Corporation (transcript is on file in the Marquette Law Review).
In describing a three day seminar titled "Repelling Corporate Takeovers: A special
three day course in the strategies and tactics of resisting corporate raids and preserv-
ing business independence" the Dean of the University of Santa Clara Law School
writes:
War used to be a simple concept.., not pleasant.., just simple. It used to
conjure up heroic images of physical battle . . . men of courage and daring
risking their lives for principle or profit.
What we are concerned with is a type of economic war. Just as many physi-
cal wars result from a coveting of one nation by another, so do these economic
wars stem from one corporation's desire to acquire another. And when this
happens, you've got the ingredients for a corporate takeover battle.
The cover of the brochure for the seminar shows a full-scale medieval battle complete
with castles, knights in shining armor, catapults, spears and arrows. (Copy on fie in
the Marquette Law Review).
8. Harnischfeger was able to fend off the Paccar takeover because the acquisition
would violate § 7 of The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. See In the Matter of Harnisch-




rectors' hands; high liquidity and low debt/equity ratio; ex-
cess, hidden, understated or undervalued assets; weak or
timid management; or poor stock market performance.9 When
faced with such a situation incumbent management, to ward
off a future takeover bid, has a number of shark repellant op-
tions. Measures such as amending the articles of incorporation
to raise voting requirements for mergers or acquisitions, rein-
corporating in a state with a delaying takeover statute, requir-
ing that directors only be removed for cause, staggering direc-
torships and raising quorum requirements are usually readily
available under the corporation law of the state of incorpora-
tion. 10 In addition, inserting a super majority provision in the
articles of incorporation for the approval of any tender offer
similarly discourages potential takeovers. Purchasing a highly
regulated corporation, such as a trucking firm, would also de-
lay the offer until approval could be obtained from the regula-
tory agency. Similarly, the purchase of a firm that competes
with a raider would create antitrust barriers to such a
merger.11 However, these defensive manuevers have come
under attack by the pro-takeover SEC.12 As evidence of this
position, the SEC has required that corporations disclose
shark repellant amendments in their proxy statements to
shareholders."' While many of the defensive moves suggested
above are not necessarily tied to repelling takeovers, the SEC
has taken the position that it will review all measures
"designed to make the subject company unattractive as a po-
tential target."14 State takeover laws operate within this com-
bative framework.
One more actor must be included to make the picture com-
plete. The "arbitrageur" is a person (or firm) who takes ad-
vantage of disparate prices of the same security in different
marketplaces. The arbitrageur buys stock from nontendering
9. Harrier Clichy-Peterson, Priorities in Defending Against a Cash Takeover Bid,
54 HARv. Bus. REV. 12 (1976).
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id.
12. Leiman, Recent Developments in Tender Offers: Defensive Tactics, in PLI,
TENTH ANNUAL INsTrrUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 289 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton
and R. Stevenson eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Leiman].
13. SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15230, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,748 (October 13, 1978).
14. Id. at 80,985.
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shareholders at a price slightly below the tender price and
then tenders the shares himself in order to secure his profit.15
Thus, the shareholder insures a high price for his shares even
if the tender offer is not completed, totally avoiding any of the
risks associated with holding stock which would later fall in
price if the tender offer fails.16 The existence of the arbi-
trageur forces incumbent management to represent two di-
verse sets of shareholders. Target management is placed in a
no win situation. Investors who do not tender their shares
demonstrate their confidence in present management along
with a desire for long term investment. On the other hand, the
arbitrageur shareholder seeks rapid profit, and wants the
tender offer to be completed.27
Within the tender offer framework outlined above, federal
and state legislation has taken divergent paths. This diver-
gence, the SEC1 8 and most commentators 9 suggest, preempts
15. Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Offer Transactions: The Dice Are Still
Loaded, 42 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 1, 2 n.5 (1980).
16. Id. at 11. See also Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage be Regulated?,
1978 DuKE L.J. 1000, 1012; Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 466 (1971); Stavrow, Profits in Arbitrage, Barrons, Oct. 1, 1979, at 12, col.
3.
17. Stayrow, supra note 16, at 12. Even the losers in the takeover game can make
money. The raiding company usually owns a large block of target company stock pur-
chased in anticipation of the tender offer. After the raider is rebuffed by target man-
agement, usually during negotiations to accomplish a merger or a friendly takeover,
the raider may offer the shares to the target at a premium. These transactions have
been referred to as "corporate kidnapping," or "extortion." See Blustein, More Firms
Paying Premium Prices to Wrest Shares From Antagonists, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1981,
at 21, col. 4; Fortune, May 8, 1978, at 91.
18. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329 (1979). The comments of the SEC which accompanied
the newly adopted regulations for tender offers stated:
Rule 14d-2(b) is intended to prevent public announcements by a bidder of the
material terms of its tender offer in advance of the offer's formal commence-
ment. The Commission believes that this practice is detrimental to the inter-
ests of investors and results in many of the abuses the Williams Act was en-
acted to prevent.
19. See Comment, The Effect of the New SEC Rules on the Constitutionality of
State Takeover Statutes, 8 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 913, 914 n.8 (1980); Aranow & Ein-
horn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 767 (1971);
Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Compe-
tency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Langevoort]; Moylan,
State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Moylan]; Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORUHAM L. Rzv. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wilner &
Landy]; Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Of-
fers, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1133 (1974) (State statutes are preempted by the Williams
1981]
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the state regulation. While the legislative intent of the Wil-
liams Act suggests neutrality, intending to neither favor nor
disfavor tender offers,20 many have viewed the SEC as having
a strong pro-takeover bias.21 State statutes, on the other hand,
generally improve incumbent management's position by fur-
nishing them with a tool, delay, often considered fatal to a
tender offer.22
III. THE WILLIAMS ACT
In response to the growing number of tender offers2" Con-
gress enacted the Williams Act.24 Congress was concerned
with affording shareholders protection from hostile take-
overs.25 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the legislative his-
tory of the Act, stated: "[t]he purpose of the Williams Act is
to insure that public shareholders who are confronted by a
cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to re-
spond without adequate information regarding the qualifica-
tions and intentions of the offering party."28 The Act has a
two-fold purpose. First, Congress designed the law to insure
that investors were well informed, and second, Congress in-
Act). But see The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to
Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872 (1978) and Note, Securities Law and the Con-
stitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979) (State
statutes should not be preempted by the Williams Act). Wilner & Landy argue that
the state statutes are preempted principally because the advance notice and hearing
requirements frustrate the purpose of the Williams Act. Additionally, they argue
there is pervasive federal regulation in the tender offer area and that certain takeover
provisions, particularly withdrawal and proration provisions, are in direct conflict
with the Williams Act. Wilner & Landy, supra note 19, at 23-32.
20. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
21. Leiman, supra note 12, at 290.
22. See Steinberg, 5 C.P.S. (BNA), The Contested Cash Tender Offer: Practical,
Economic, and Legal Considerations of the Offeror A-15 (1978).
23. The number of tender offers increased from 8 to 107 in the six years between
1960 and 1966. The number of tender offers peaked in 1968 at 139. In 1970 they
declined to 34 but by 1978 there were over 100. See 111 CONG. REc. 24662-64 (1967);
Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 400 (1980).
24. Pub. L. No. 90-439 (originally enacted July 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 454) amended by
Pub. L. No. 91-567 (December 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 1497).
25. S. REP. N6.55.90th Con.gj 1st Sess. 3 (1967). See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Inc., 430 U.S. f, 2(1977); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v.
Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
26. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
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tended the law to favor neither the offeror nor the target.27
The mechanics of the Act require a person or corporation
that acquires five percent or more of any class of equity secur-
ities of a registered company to file a Schedule 13D with both
the SEC and the target company.2 8 This filing must occur
within ten days after the five percent ownership level has
been reached. 29 Among other things, the offeror must disclose
the amount and source of the funds for the purchase, his iden-
tity and the extent of his holdings in the company.30 In addi-
tion, any plans the offeror might have for major changes in
the structure or operations of the target, such as plans to liq-
uidate the target, sell its assets or merge it with another com-
pany, must also be disclosed. 1
Additionally, section 14(d) of the Exchange Act provides
that those required to file under section 13(d) must also file
any solicitation materials prepared in connection with the
tender offer with the SEC.3 2 This 14(d)-i statement provides
for the additional disclosure of such things as the offeror's
past transaction with the company, 3 and any other material
financial information about the offeror.34 The material facts
required to be disclosed include any possible antitrust or legal
conflicts which might arise as a result of the tender offer.35
The relevant facts set forth in the Schedule 14D-1 are sent
to both the target company and its shareholders
simultaneously.3 6
The filing and disclosure requirements are just a part of
the Williams Act. In addition, there are several substantive
provisions which provide protection to target company share-
holders. First, the shareholder is provided with a seven-day
withdrawal period after receipt of the offer.37 The shareholder
27. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977); Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).




32. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
33. Id.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1979).
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100(5) (1979).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
1981]
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may similarly withdraw if after sixty days from the date of the
original tender offer 8 the offeror has not purchased the
shares.3" Second, when the number of shares tendered is
greater than the number of shares originally sought, the of-
feror is required to purchase the shares tendered in the first
ten days of the offer, on a pro rata basis.'0 Third, any change
in the terms of the offer, such as an increase in the purchase
price, applies to all of the shareholders even after they have
tendered their shares.41 Finally, the Act also contains a broad
anti-fraud provision.' 2
Effective January 7, 1980, the SEC promulgated new rules
pertaining to tender offers.'3 In the words of the Commission,
the new rules are designed to "implement existing statutory
requirements by providing specific filing, delivery and disclo-
sure requirements, optional dissemination provisions and ad-
ditional substantive regulatory protections."'44 Especially im-
portant in light of state regulation is rule 14d-2 which
establishes the criteria for commencement of tender offers.' 5
The rule provides that a public announcement by an offeror
through a press release, newspaper advertisement or public
statement will constitute the commencement of a cash tender
offer, provided further that the statement include the identity
of both the offeror and the target company, the amount and
class of securities being sought and the price or range of prices
being offered.'6
This new rule is expressly designed to prevent public an-
nouncements of the tender offer's material terms prior to the
offer's formal commencement. 7 Many of the state takeover
statutes had specifically provided for a precommencement no-
38. Commencement of the tender offer is measured from the date of filing the
Schedule 14D-1 with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). It is not yet settled whether a private right of action
exists under this section. For a general discussion of this problem see Note, Standing
Under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: May a Tender Offeror
Sue for Injunctive Relief, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 405 (1979-80).
43. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240 (1979). See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979).
44. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979).
45. Id. at 70,328.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1979).
47. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329 (1979).
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tification period.4 s While the Commission stated that the pur-
pose of prohibiting precommencement public announcements
was for the protection of shareholders,49 it is clear that such a
provision will reinforce the SEC's position that state regula-
tion in the tender offer area is preempted.50
In promulgating such regulations the SEC relied upon its
perception of the legislative intent behind the Williams Act.
Both the Senate and House reports accompanying the Wil-
liams Act state:
Without knowledge of who the bidder is and what he plans
to do, the shareholder cannot reach an informed decision.
He is forced to take a chance. For no matter what he does,
he does it without adequate information to enable him to
decide rationally what is the best possible course of action.
This is precisely the kind of dilemma which our security
laws are designed to prevent.51
Precommencement notification forces a shareholder to re-
spond to the offer without full and adequate information. Fur-
ther, such an announcement will probably trigger arbitrageur
activity resulting in volatile disruptions in the price for which
the shares are traded. It is felt that rule 14d-2 will help to
eliminate this arbitrage activity, which in turn will benefit tar-
get company shareholders.
52
Generally, the new rules are designed to protect the share-
holder of the target company. For example, the target com-
pany is required to publish a statement disclosing its position
with respect to the tender offer.53 The target must either ac-
cept or reject the offer, express no opinion and assure neu-
traility toward the offer, or state that it is unable to express
an opinion toward the offer." This information is part of the
48. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3(F) (1976).
49. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329 (1979).
50. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173 (1979).
51. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
52. Comment, The Effect of the New S.E.C. Rules on the Constitutionality of
State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 913, 923 (1979-1980) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(2)(a) (1980).
54. Id. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 70,338-9 (1979).
19811
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
new Schedule 14D-955 which the target company must file as
soon as praticable after the date the company's position is
first announced to its shareholders. "6
The additional information required in the Schedule 14D-
9 greatly expands the scope of the disclosure required of the
target company.57 Certain negotiations and transactions by
the target company, any actual or potential conflicts of inter-
est and such additional information as may be necessary to
keep the shareholders informed must be included in the
Schedule 14D-9.51 If any material changes in the tender offer
occur, the target is also required to amend the Schedule 14D-9
in a manner reasonably designed to inform the shareholders
of such change."
In Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse, 0 the va-
lidity of SEC rule 14d-2 was challenged. An Ohio statute pre-
vented an offeror, in this case Canadian Pacific, from making
its offer until at least twenty days after public announcement
of the terms. 1 Canadian Pacific successfully argued that it
was impossible to comply with the twenty-day provision in
the Ohio statute, given the five-day provision in rule 14d-2.62
Having publicly announced the identities of the offeror and
the target, the amount and class of securities sought, and. the
price, Canadian Pacific was required by 14d-2 to commence or
withdraw its offer within five business days of the announce-
ment. The Ohio twenty-day rule would prohibit Canadian Pa-
cific from making its offer within the federally mandated
period.
The Southern District of Ohio had already decided in
AMCA International Corp. v. Krouse6 that the Williams Act
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1980).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1980).
57. Prior to the adoption of these rules the target company was under no obliga-
tion to disclose anything. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1-4, 100 (1976).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 14d-101 (1979).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 14d-9(b) (1979).
60. Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 97,863 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 1981).
61. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(3)(1) (Page 1979).
62. Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. RaP. (CCH) 97,863, at 90,349 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 1981).
63. AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
[Vol. 64:657
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did not preempt the Ohio Act. 4 However, the AMCA court
took judicial notice of pending rule 14d-2(b), stating, "the
Ohio Act in its present form will indisputably be preempted
when the new federal regulation becomes effective."6 This
statement was based upon the Supreme Court pronouncement
in Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul,6 where the court held
that the federal exclusion of state law is inescapable where it
is physically impossible to comply with both."
The court in Canadian Pacific Enterprises took a two-step
approach in analyzing the validity of the new rules. First, the
court reviewed the statutory authority relied on by the SEC in
promulgating rule 14d-268 to decide whether, taken individu-
ally and collectively, these sections authorize the SEC to pre-
scribe the timing of announcement and filing relative to the
making of a tender offer. Then, the court relied on the stan-
dard of review for formal rulemaking found in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 9 to determine whether the SEC ex-
ceeded its agency authority in promulgating rule 14d-2.
This is a crucial battle for proponents of state regulation.
If rule 14d-2 is a valid exercise of agency authority and the
SEC satisfies the arbitrary and capricious test of section 706
of the Administrative Procedure Act, a court need only resort
to an analysis of the clear physical preemption of the state
laws without any inquiry into the purposes of the federal or
state legislation.7 0 This argument is enhanced by the SEC's
position that it is not the commencement date alone which
conflicts with the State regulation. All of the time periods in
the Williams Act, minimum periods, withdrawal and pro rata
rights, and best price, are keyed into the commencement
64. Id. at 933-34.
65. Id. at 933-34 n.4. It should be noted that the other reported decisions which
arose subsequent to the promulgation of rule 14d-2 offer little guidance in resolving
the validity issue. In Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,731 (3d Cir. Dec. 17, 1980) the court presumed the validity of the
regulations. See also Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SM. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,863, at 90,352 n.8 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 1981).
66. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
67. Id. at 142-43.
68. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979). The following sections of the Exchange Act
were relied on: 3(b), 14(d), 14(e) and 23(a).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. I 1977).
70. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
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date. 1 Thus, any state statute which deviates from the time
schedule established in rule 14d-2 would be preempted, and
every state statute in one way or another delays the tender
offer process.7 12
Each of the four sections relied on by the SEC in promul-
gating the new rules needs to be examined. First, section 3(b)
of the Exchange Act provides that "[tihe Commission ...
shall have the power by rules and regulations to define techni-
cal, trade, accounting, and other terms used in this chapter,
consistently with the provisions and purposes of this chap-
ter. 7 3 While the Williams Act does not use the term com-
mencement, nor is it found anywhere in the Exchange Act,
the Canadian Pacific court held that the term defines a tech-
nical term, and is a key concept of the Act. Specifically, sec-
tion 14(d)(1) of the Act 4 provides that it is unlawful to make
a tender offer unless, at the time the offer is made, copies are
first sent to shareholders. However, the court failed to note
that commencement provisions involve much more than the
simple setting of a date. The commencement provisions also
include substantial disclosure requirements to insure uniform-
ity and shareholder protection. Indeed, the disclosure require-
ments appear to have been selected to insure that they would
conflict with the federal rules.
Section 23(a) of the Exchange Act" probably provides a
much sounder basis for the regulation. This section gives a
broad, general rulemaking authority to the SEC, "to make
such rules as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this chapter . . . .,,The Supreme Court has
consistently held that regulations promulgated under such
sections will be sustained so long as they are "reasonably re-
lated to the purposes of the enabling legislation. 7 7 As dis-
cussed above, the purpose of rule 14d-2 is to further share-
71. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329 (1979).
72. Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical
Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 733, 737 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Boehm].
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1976).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1976).
76. Id.
77. Mourning v. Family Publication Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (quot-
ing Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)).
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holder protection and maintain the stated neutrality between
the target and the offeror set forth in the Williams Act. The
establishment of a commencement date clearly furthers this
purpose.
The final two sections of the Exchange Act relied on by
the SEC, 14(d)(4)"8 and 14(e),79 both involve substantive pro-
tections designed to regulate the conduct of those involved in
tender offers, and especially protect against fraud and other
manipulative behavior. The establishment of a commence-
ment date by the SEC is especially competent within the
meaning of these two sections, due to the arbitrage activity
associated with the commencement of a tender offer. Unso-
phisticated shareholders are easily taken advantage of as the
price of the shares becomes volatile.80 However, while the
commencement criteria in rule 14d-2 does provide for some
minimum protections to shareholders faced with this di-
lemma, state statutes go much further. This is especially true
in states like Wisconsin which provide for a hearing before the
Commissioner of Securities to determine the fairness of the
offer.81 Since the Williams Act is a minimum disclosure stat-
ute, it might be argued that state statutes can go further in
the protection of shareholders.
Upon completing this analysis the district court in Cana-
dian Pacific Enterprises determined that the promulgation of
rule 14d-2 was abundantly authorized by the enabling sec-
tions. Undertaking a narrow review of the regulation under
the arbitrary and capricious standard the court then held that
the regulations were reasonably related to the purposes of the
Williams Act as expressed in the legislative history..2 More-
over, the court recognized that the delays incumbent in state
regulation were designed to aid the target company manage-
ment, in express contravention of the neutrality of the Wil-
liams Act. The purpose of the Williams Act, to protect inves-
tors, would be frustrated by state efforts to provide a
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1976).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
80. Wilner & Landy, supra note 19, at 10; Preempting the Maze, supra note 7, at
860.
81. Wis STAT. § 552.05 (1979).
82. Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,863, at 90,356 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 1981).
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defensive tactic to target companies. Applying the arbitrary
and capricious standard, the court found that the findings of
the SEC were based upon a rational foundation."3 The court
specifically rejected the argument that the SEC sought pre-
emption solely for the sake of preemption. Even if this were
the case, the court felt that the rulemaking process itself was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.8 4 The purpose for the regula-
tion is not controlling as long as the Commission did not act
in an arbitrary or capricious manner in promulgating the rule.
The SEC, through its rulemaking power, is not alone in
attacking the validity of state takeover laws. Three circuit
courts have reviewed state takeover statutes and all three
have held that the statutes in question were preempted.8 5
Prior to analyzing those decisions, a brief review of the struc-
ture of the state takeover laws will be presented.
IV. THE CoMPosrTON OF STATE TAKEOVER LAWS
In 1968 when the Williams Act was enacted, only Virginia
had a takeover statute and its statute had never been en-
forced. When the Williams Act was amended in 1970, two
additional states, Ohio and Nevada, had passed takeover
laws.87 However, when the amendments to the Williams Act
were considered, none of these state statutes had ever been
used. From the silence in the legislative history, it is apparent
that Congress was unaware of the state regulation in the
area.
88
State statutes vary considerably in their specific provi-
sions, although a number of common trends can be identi-
fied.' First, the jurisdictional provisions are based on the re-
83. Id. at 90,357.
84. Id.
85. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 557 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on grounds of improper venue sub noma. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443
U.S. 173 (1979); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1980); Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,731 (3d Cir. Dec. 17,
1980).
86. VA. CODE § 13.1-5.28. The Virginia statute was enacted four months prior to
the Williams Act.
87. OHIO RE V. CODE ANN. § 1707.041; Nsv. REV. STAT. § 78.376-.3778.
88. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329 n.14 (1979).
89. Brodsky, State Legislation Affecting Takeovers, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST




lationship between the target corporation and the state.9 A
combination of factors is used to determine this relationship:
(1) the target's state of incorporation;91 (2) its principal place
of business; 92 or (3) the location of substantial assets.93 The
extraterritorial effect of the state statutes has resulted in a
number of cases where more than one state has attempted to
regulate the takeover."
The jurisdictional requirements, and their extraterritorial
effect, are but one of the problems with state regulation. In
addition, state laws generally require the offeror to file more
extensive disclosures with both the target management and
the state securities commission, usually in advance of the ac-
tual offer.9 5 Thus, the resulting delay of administrative proce-
dures gives the target management a great deal of flexibility
in defending against the takeover.
While several regulatory approaches are taken by each
state, often in combination, there are a number of recurring
themes.9 8 First, a number of states have provisions similar to
the Ohio statute, which provides for precommencement notifi-
cation. 7 Typically, the disclosure statement necessary for
90. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulation of
Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. ECON. 371, 378 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Jarrell &
Bradley].
91. All states rely on this jurisdictional provision.
92. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (substantial
assets and principal place of business); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-2m (West Supp. 1981)
(principal place of business or substantial assets).
93. See, e.g., IDAHO COD. § 30-1502 (Supp. 1980); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 47-32-3
(Supp. 1980).
94. A most recent example of this problem arose when Seagram Company an-
nounced a $2.03 billion tender offer for St. Joe Minerals Corporation, the largest pro-
ducer of lead in the United States. The management of St. Joe's rejected the $45 per
share offer as too low. Sensing a fight, Seagrams sought injunctions to have the New
York and Nebraska takeover laws declared invalid. Additionally, Seagrams stated it
was prepared to fight the Missouri and Louisiana statutes which were also applicable.
See Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1981, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
95. State laws generally require more disclosure than is required in Schedule 13-
D, although in some states a copy of the Schedule 13-D is sufficient. See, e.g., wis.
STAT. § 552.03(2) (1979).
96. Boehm, supra note 72, at 733; M. LProN & E. STmNBERGF, TAKEovS AND
FREEzEoUTS 239-40 (1978); Nathan and Maloney, State Tender Offer Statutes: An
Analysis of the Practical and Policy Considerations, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rnv. 647
(1978); Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to
Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 872 (1978).
97. See the discussion accompanying notes 60-67 supra.
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precommencement notification contains the elements of com-
mencement in rule 14d-2.98
Second, state laws generally require that the offeror hold
tender offers open for longer than the ten-day federal period.
For example, Massachusetts and Michigan force the tender
offer to be held open for at least sixty days." In addition,
states usually provide for liberal withdrawal rights, which ef-
fectively extend the tender offer period.100
Perhaps the most important feature of the state anti-take-
over laws is the provision for administrative review. If the tar-
get is within the jurisdictional reach of the state (usually it
will be within the reach of more than one state)101 a hearing
can be requested by the target with the state's securities com-
mission.102 The Illinois statute invalidated in Mite Corp. v.
Dixon is representative of the various states' review sections.
In fact, the Wisconsin statutes were almost identical to the
Illinois statute. The Wisconsin statutes have since been
amended, although it is not clear that the revisions will pass
constitutional review unscathed. Generally, these review pro-
visions contain the following elements. The commissioner, in
his own discretion, may require that the offeror file any other
additional information which the commissioner deems mate-
rial to the takeover.103 If the commissioner is dissatisfied with
the offeror's disclosure, in that it does not contain all the in-
formation required or does not provide full disclosure to
'shareholders of all material information covering the offer, the
commissioner may, by order, summarily delay the offer.104 In
addition, the commissioner is empowered to call a hearing
concerning the offer, for the protection of the state's share-
98. Id.
99. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110c, § 7 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 451.905(2) (Supp. 1979).
100. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 90, at 378.
101. Of the states that do not regulate takeovers, only California is a major indus-
trial center. The other states without takeover provisions are: Alabama, Arizona,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.
102. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110c §§ 1-13 (West Cum. Supp. 1981);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1281 (Supp. 1980);
N.M. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:5 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)(ii) (Supp.
1979).




holders. °5 If the target company requests a hearing, the com-
missioner must call one.106 The statute provides further that,
if the commissioner finds that the offer fails to provide for full
and fair disclosure to shareholders of all material information
concerning the offer, or that the offer is unfair or inequitable
to shareholders, the commissioner shall order denial of the re-
gistration of the offer. 07 Finally, the commissioner may also
seek an injunction against anyone who appears, to the com-
missioner, to have violated the state's anti-takeover law. 08
Finally, state takeover statutes generally contain enforce-
ment mechanisms. The state securities commission can often
order both cease and desist orders and injunctions.'09 Viola-
tions of the statutory provisions can result in a broad range of
penalties, such as criminal prosecutions, fines and forfeitures,
and civil liability. 10 However, the biggest penalty to the of-
feror may be the delay which attaches to the administrative
process.
While the purpose of the state statutes may be to protect
shareholders, there is no doubt that their main effect is the
protection of target company management from unfriendly
tender offers."' It is clear that the hearing provisions and
precommencement notification result in substantial delay, to
the advantage of the target company. Tender offers may be
discouraged as the target organizes its defensive maneuvers.
Wilner and Landy argue that these delays result in sizable
price fluctuations, which may result in the SEC ordering a
halt to the trading of the target's shares."'
It is less clear, however, that the delay resulting from the
state regulations is not in the best interests of the sharehold-
105. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(4) (1979).
106. Id.
107. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(5) (1979). See also In the Matter of Harnischfeger Corp.,
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,535 (Deputy Commissioner of Securities 1979); In the
Matter of Pabst Brewing Co., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,415 (Commissioner of
Securities 1978); In the Matter of EZ Paints Corp. and Newell Companies, Inc., 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,063 (Commissioner of Securities 1973).
108. Wis. STAT. § 552.17 (1979).
109. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:11 (Supp. 1979).
110. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.991 (Supp. 1977); MISS. CODE ANN. §9 75-72-
121, 21 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. §§ 552.19, .21 (1979).
111. Moylan, supra note 19, at 688 (1975).
112. Wilner & Landy, supra note 19, at 10-11.
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ers. First, the longer the delay, the more opportunity the tar-
get company has to search out a white knight, thereby effect-
ing a more compatible union.11 Not only is the price usually
higher, but there is also less disruption of management and
company operations. This results in a less costly takeover.
Moreover, the administrative mechanisms for delay in state
regulation may in fact foster the market place competition
sought in the Williams Act.11 The delay and disclosure re-
quirements allow for more competition in the tender offer
market place. The successful offeror will be forced to pay a
higher premium in order to outbid the competition resulting
from such regulation. 1 5 An empirical study has shown a
steady increase in the average cash tender price premium,1
from 32 percent prior to the Williams Act to nearly 53 percent
after its passage.117 The study concludes that the effect of
state laws has been to increase the average cash tender pre-
mium from 53 percent to 73 percent.1 8 Armed with this data,
a target company may be able to successfully present a valid
legal and economic argument on the validity of state regula-
tion.119 However, to date the courts have been more willing to
adopt the SEC preemption argument.
V. RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING THE STATE REGULATION OF
TENDER OFFERS
A. Preemption
Raiding corporations urge that state takeover laws are pre-
empted under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. 20
"No simple formula can capture the complexities of this de-
termination; the conflicts which may develop between state
and federal action are as varied as the fields to which congres-
113. Boehm, supra note 72, at 737.
114. See Strode v. Elsmark, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,538 (Cir. Ct. Ky. May 13, 1980).
115. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 90, at 373.
116. Id. The measure of tender price premium used was the tender price per share
divided by the target's share value forty days prior to the offer minus one, after
adjustments for stock splits and dividends.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See the discussion accompanying notes 153-61, infra.
120. U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 10.
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sional action may apply.1' 21 Each case will turn on the pecu-
liar interaction of the state and federal schemes in question,122
so that prior cases only furnish rough guidelines for the courts
to follow.123 The general test to be followed was summarized
by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Rath Packing Co.:12
The first inquiry is whether Congress, pursuant to its
power to regulate commerce, U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, has
prohibited state regulation of the particular aspects of com-
merce involved in this case .... [W]hen Congress has "un-
mistakably... ordained," Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963), that its
enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce, state
laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall. This re-
sult is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly
stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); [citation omitted].
Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state
legislation in the same field nevertheless override state laws
with which they conflict. U.S. Const., Art. VI. The criterion
for determining whether state and federal laws are so incon-
sistent that the state law must give way is firmly established
in our decisions. Our task is "to determine whether, under
the circumstances of this particular case, [the State's] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Accord, De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637, 649 (1971); [citation omitted]. This inquiry requires us
to consider the relationship between state and federal laws
as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are
written.125
Congress has not expressly chosen to preempt the states
from regulating tender offers. 26 In fact, section 28(a) of the
1934 Exchange Act 27 appears to have a contrary tone. 2 " The
121. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
122. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
123. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1980).
124. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
125. Id. at 525-26.
126. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
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section provides that: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission. . . of any state over
any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with
the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder. '129 It is argued, however, that section 28, being a
part of the original Exchange Act in 1934, was designed to
preserve state blue sky laws already in existence and has no
effect on state regulation of tender offers. 130 As has already
been noted, the legislative history of the Williams Act is silent
with respect to the question of the preemption of state regula-
tions, as no such regulation was yet in existence.131
The Seventh Circuit, in Mite Corp. v. Dixon3 2 also re-
jected an implicit preemption argument. However, at least one
commentator has suggested that the Williams Act, coupled
with the new SEC rules, presents such a pervasive scheme of
federal regulation as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it. 183 In
Mite, the court rejected any attempt to analogize the tender
offer regulation field to the facts of City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc.,134 the leading implicit preemption
case. In City of Burbank, a city curfew of jet flights was held
to be preempted by the Noise Control Act of 1972.135 The
Mite court stated that the detailed and comprehensive
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that led to pre-
emption in City of Burbank was not present in the Williams
Act. Essentially, the court stated the Williams Act is a mini-
mum disclosure act which does not present the same compre-
hensive scheme found in City of Burbank. This appears to
leave the door open to state regulations which, for a legitimate
state purpose, would require more extensive disclosure.13
Where Congress has legislated in an area of paramount
128. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
130. See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 248. But see Wilner & Landy, supra note
19, at 29.
131. See the discussion accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
132. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
133. See Comment, supra note 52, at 931. Contra, Langevoort, supra note 19, at
248.
134. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
135. Id. at 633.
136. 633 F.2d at 490.
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federal importance, preemption has also been found, even if
the federal legislation does not present a pervasive scheme.""7
In areas such as foreign affairs 38 and national security 3 9 the
Supreme Court has held that state statutes were implicitly
preempted. Federal securities regulation is not of equivalent
paramount concern. "On the contrary, the absence of an ex-
clusive federal interest in the field of securities regulation is
persuasively demonstrated by the historically coordinate role
of state regulation in the field. 1 40
Thus, in the absence of either explicit or implicit preemp-
tion, the issue is whether "[the states'] law stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."'41 Utilizing this rationale, the
state takeover laws of eleven states have been preempted.14 2
The purpose of the Williams Act is crucial under this pre-
emption analysis when determining whether the federal
scheme leaves room for state regulation as the courts attempt
to balance the competing interests. The dominant theme of
the Williams Act is investor protection.148 This is essentially
achieved through a variety of disclosure provisions, operating
137. Id.
138. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
139. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
140. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 491-92. Accord, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 137 (1973).
141. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
142. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois); Kennecott Corp.
v. Smith, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731 (3d Cir. Dec. 17,
1980) (New Jersey); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub non. Leroy v. Great Western United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho); Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse,
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,863 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 1981)
(Ohio); Hi-Shear Industries, Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,804 (D. S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) (South Carolina); Hi-Shear Industries,
Inc. v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,805 (D. Conn.
Dec. 16, 1980) (Connecticut); Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.
Ind. 1978) (Delaware); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Penn-
sylvania); Kelly or ex rel. McLaughlin v. Beta-X Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1197,897 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1981) (Michigan); Natomas Co.
v. Bryan, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,232 (D. Nev. April 8, 1981) (Ne-
vada); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1198,247 (E.D. La.
Apr. 30, 1979) (Louisiana); Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) % 98,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981) (Oklahoma).
143. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
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under the assumption that the best protection investors can
have is information.
The approach the Williams Act takes is referred to as a
"market approach." "The function of federal regulation is to
get information to the investor by allowing both the offeror
and the incumbent managers of a target company to present
fully their arguments and then let the investor decide for him-
self. 14 4 Clearly, those state provisions concerning precom-
mencement notification are void because they are in direct
conflict with the Williams Act. It is also urged that provisions
of the state statutes which seek additional disclosure and
place great discretion in the securities commission are void
because of the delay incurred which is inimical to the Wil-
liams Act design. Delay is, as we have already seen, the most
potent weapon target management has at its disposal.
In Kenncott Corp. v. Smith, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals made clear its opposition to such delaying provisions:
The "market approach" for protecting investors established
by the Williams Act contemplates the free flow of informa-
tion from both sides, so that the shareholders can make an
unfettered and knowledgeable choice whether to relinquish
their shares for a cash premium. When commencement of
the offer, which entails distribution of information, is
delayed, the market approach cannot be effectuated, be-
cause the choice can no longer be an informed one. While
the shareholders have yet to receive the benefit of full
knowledge of the merits and terms of the challenger's offer,
the target's management can use the period of delay to send
materials to the shareholders in order to discourage them
from tendering their stock. 145
The defensive maneuvers which become available to the
target management as a result of the delay take away the
shareholder autonomy which the Williams Act is designed to
protect. Ancillary effects such as the detrimental effects on
the stock market, the possiblity of frustrating the eventual
success of a tender offer, and the increased cost to the offeror
144. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 492 (quoting Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978)).
145. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,731, at 98,836 (3rd Cir. Dec. 17, 1980).
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who is usually paying interest on money borrowed to complete
the tender offer, all weigh heavily against state efforts to delay
tender offers.146 In essence, the cumulative impact of the ef-
fects flowing from delay in the commencement of the offer is
to "disrupt the neutrality essential to the execution and the
proper operation of the market approach for protecting inves-
tors embraced by the Williams Act. '147
Additional arguments were used to strike down the provi-
sions for administrative review and hearings found in the Illi-
nois and South Carolina statutes. These provisions were in
many respects identical to the former Wisconsin provisions
which empower the securities commissioner to hold hearings
on the fairness of the tender offer.141 The Illinois Act, for ex-
ample, empowers the Secretary of State to pass on the sub-
stantive fairness of the tender offer and to prohibit it from
going forward if the Secretary finds the offer inequitable. 49
Not only does this create enormous potential for delay, but it
also substitutes the judgment of the reviewing body for that
of the investors. This approach, known as the "benevolent bu-
reaucracy" approach, is fundamentally inconsistent with the
Williams Act purposes. 150 The Williams Act contemplates un-
fettered choice by investors who have been informed as a re-
sult of the disclosure requirements. Both the House and Sen-
ate reports observed that the Williams Act "is designed to
make the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a
fair opportunity to make their decision."151 Hearing type stat-
utes, therefore, frustrate the express Congressional intent to
allow shareholders to make their own decisions under a mar-
ket approach. Investor protection at the expense of investor
autonomy is a result inconsistent with the federal scheme.
Such substitution of judgment is not tolerable under the Wil-
liams Act.
146. Id. at 98,837.
147. Hi-Shear Industries, Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,032 (D. S.C. Dec. 4, 1980); see also Mite Corp. v. Dixon,
633 F.2d at 495.
148. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(4)-(5) (1979). See also discussion accompanying notes
103-08, supra.
149. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1 § 137.57.E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980).
150. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 494.
151. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); S. REP. No. 555, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
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The problem with the approach taken by Congress is that,
while it expresses a desire to protect investors, it also restricts
the ability of target management to seek a better price, thus
restricting competition. Studies of price variations in premi-
ums which offerors eventually pay when faced with the possi-
bility of delay indicate a much greater percentage premium.
152
A true market approach would encourage competition and not
simply encourage disclosure of information. The problem,
however, is that courts are constrained by the legislative pur-
pose, and cannot substitute their judgment for that of
Congress.
While contrary to the Williams Act, there may be legiti-
mate state interests in the protection of investors in the
tender offer area. Four different concerns have been identified
to legitimate state regulation of takeovers:
First, states wish to assure that resident shareholders are
given enough time and information to make an informed
judgment as to a transaction that is, in substance, a trans-
formation of the corporate structure. Second, takeover legis-
lation may be viewed as an exercise of the states' right to
prescribe the attributes of a share of stock in a corporation
organized under their laws. Third, to the extent the statute
seeks to impede the departure of corporate plant and facili-
ties, it is prompted by economic regulatory considerations.
Fourth, to the extent statutes apply to corporations head-
quartered in the state, it reflects the states' desire to im-
prove the quality of life within their borders. 15 8
Three decisions prior to the SEC's promulgation of the
new rules validated state takeover statutes relying on the
above listed state interests. In AMCA International Corp. v.
Krouse,'5 various notice provisions of the Ohio takeover stat-
ute and an administrative review provision were viewed as
presenting no "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 1 55 However,
the court's decision in Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v.
Krouse 56 overrules the AMCA decision.157
152. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 90, at 373.
153. Boehm, supra note 72, at 746.
154. 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
155. Id. at 936.
156. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,863 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13,
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In a similar fashion the Kentucky takeover statute has
been held valid in light of the Williams Act. In Strode v. Es-
mark,15 a Kentucky circuit court ruled that Kentucky had a
legitimate state interest in regulating the internal affairs of
companies having a significant nexus with Kentucky. The
court found that it was the expressed intent of Congress,
under section 28(a) of the Act, to allow states to regulate take-
overs.159 However, because of the direct conflict with Ken-
tucky's notice provisions, the Williams Act probably preempts
the Kentucky statute. It is fairly clear that the only purpose
of the Kentucky statute is to delay tender offers. There are no
additional disclosures of information to shareholders, nor is
there a provision for administrative review.
Finally, in Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp.,60 the court took a
somewhat different approach in upholding the Delaware stat-
ute over both commerce clause and preemption objections.
The Delaware statute did not provide for administrative re-
view, although it did extend the time period of the tender of-
fer. This waiting period was designed to allow stockholders
sufficient time to review the information related to the offer.
The court held that this short delay imposed no burden on
interstate commerce because it did not pose a threat to the
successful completion of the offer. 61
In addition, the Delaware Chancery Court held that the
Delaware Act was not preempted by the Williams Act. The
court responded to the argument that the Delaware Act upset
the claimed neutrality of the federal scheme as follows: "True
1981).
157. Id. at 90,351. See also discussion accompanying notes 60-84 supra.
158. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,538 (Cir. Ct. Ky. May
13, 1980). In affirming the trial court's decision the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted
that the delay which resulted from complying with the Kentucky statute increased
the premium paid to the shareholders. Such a result, they felt, was consistent with
the Williams Act. Esmark v. Strode, [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,238, at
91,582 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 1981).
159. Id. at 97,806.
160. 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980). But see GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980) where the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that on remand
the trial court should review the arguable conflict in waiting periods between the Del-
aware Act and the federal rules. In addition an Indiana District Court reviewing the
Delaware Act found it unconstitutional in Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
161. 412 A.2d at 344.
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neutrality means that neither side in tender offer battles
should be permitted to deny a stockholder the opportunity to
make an informed decision. ' 162 The Delaware Act simply pro-
vided more protection for the investor. Since the Williams Act
is a minimum disclosure statute, such additional stockholder
protections appear consistent with the federal law. While such
an analysis does not have popular support, with the majority
of decisions finding preemption, it is persuasive. Investors
purchase stock to make money. Delay results in higher premi-
ums paid, and therefore a greater return to the investors. It
may be that the best interests of the investors are served in
this fashion.
B. Commerce Clause
The final challenge to the validity of state regulation of
takeovers arises under the commerce clause.16 3 This question
need not be reached once the court finds preemption. How-
ever, some courts have relied on this analysis, concluding that
the state statutes not only are preempted but also violate the
commerce clause."" The Supreme Court outlined the test to
be used in determining whether state legislation impermissi-
bly interferes with or hinders interstate commerce in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in re-
lation to the putative local benefits [citation omitted]. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tol-
erated will of course depend on the nature of the local inter-
est involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.165
The commerce clause challenge raises the problems at-
tendant to the extraterritorial effect of the state takeover stat-
162. Id. at 349.
163. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8 provides that: "[t]he Congress shall have the power
... to regulate commerce... among the several states."
164. Hi-Shear Industries, Inc. v. Campbell, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
97,804 (D. S.C. Dec. 4, 1980).
165. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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utes. In Hi-Shear Industries, Inc. v. Campbell,16' South Caro-
lina attempted to enforce its takeover law on a tender offer.
Hi-Shear had commenced an offer to purchase Raybestos. Hi-
Shear is a Connecticut corporation, with its principal place of
business also in Connecticut. Raybestos is a Delaware corpo-
ration, with New York as its principal place of business. Ray-
bestos employs about 500 people in South Carolina, bringing
it within the state's takeover law, yet less than one percent of
all outstanding shares of Raybestos were owned by South Car-
olina citizens.
The court held that for the South Carolina Act to have
such global impact places an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce.1 67 While South Carolina may have a legiti-
mate local interest in preventing locally managed corporations
from being taken over by foreign corporations,1 8 the jurisdic-
tional reach of the statute does not so limit its effects. As
summarized by the Seventh Circuit in Mite Corp. v. Dixon a
jurisdictional scheme such as this is not permissible:
The Act's most obvious burdens result from its global im-
pact. Once the Act has been invoked, all purchases, or offers
to purchase by the offeror, of the target company's stock
pursuant to a tender offer may be halted, including transac-
tions to be executed entirely outside the boundaries of [the
state]. The ... Act thus possesses a significant potential to
cause commercial disruption .... Moreover, the disruptive
effects of the... Act could be duplicated by other states
seeking simultaneously to assert jurisdiction over a tender
offer. 169
VI. WISCONSIN STATUTE SECTION 552: A STATE OF FLUX
In response to the constitutional attacks on state takeovers
laws, a number of states, including Wisconsin, have amended
their statutes in an attempt to avoid judicial invalidity.17 0 Ac-
cording to Richard Malmgren, the Wisconsin Commissioner of
Securities and the author of the Wisconsin amendments, the
166. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804 (D. S.C. Dec. 4, 1980).
167. Id. at 90,033.
168. Id.
169. 633 F.2d 486, 502.
170. 1980 Wis. LAws ch. 16. See also SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 605 F-1.
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new Wisconsin takeover provisions are flexible enough to
avoid the fate of those state statutes which have been invali-
dated.17 1 The amendments remove many of the problems
which courts previously identified to invalidate state takeover
laws. While the validity of the changes are unclear until chal-
lenged, they appear to provide for regulations which are com-
patible with the Williams Act.
The obstacles to an unfriendly tender offer are much less
severe under the new provisions."7 2 Eliminated is the require-
ment that the commissioner of securities must, upon request
by the target management, hold a hearing concerning a take-
over registration. Instead, it is within the sole discretion of the
commissioner.17 3 Also eliminated was one of the bases for de-
nying registration. A finding that the tender offer is inequita-
ble can no longer serve as a basis for denying registration.17 4
The denial of registration is only permitted where the corpo-
rate takeover law is violated, or the offeror is delinquent in
filing ownership information, or where the offeror has in-
cluded false or misleading information in the filing. 7 5
In addition, the amendment conforms all of the time re-
quirements to the federal provisions. 7 6 A comity provision is
intended to avoid more than one state regulating a take-
over. 7 7 While this provision attempts to eliminate the major
commerce clause objection to state takeover statutes, it ap-
pears to be flawed. The new section provides that the Wiscon-
sin statute will not apply to any takeover regulated by an-
other state. However, once the Wisconsin administrative
decision is made, a target company could simply invoke the
laws of a state without a similar provision.
Finally, the new law gives the commissioner a number of
options in passing on a request for registration of a takeover.
Previously, the commissioner could only approve or deny such
171. Milwaukee Sentinel, June 29, 1981, sec. 2 at 7, col. 3.
172. Under prior law, friendly takeovers were excluded from takeover registration
requirements. This new statute eliminates this exclusion. 1981 Wis. Laws ch. 16, § 9.
173. Id., § 9(4).
174. Id. at (5).
175. Id.
176. Id. at § 12.
177. Wis. STAT. § 552.05 (1979-1980).
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a request.178 Now, the commissioner may also either postpone
registration for up to 180 days or permit registration of an
amended offer.179 In addition, the commissioner is also per-
mitted to issue an exemption from registration, permitting a
takeover offer to commence where the offeror's purchase of se-
curities is contingent upon subsequent registration.1 80 It is
this final provision which will probably allow the Wisconsin
statute to survive. It is now possible for the commissioner to
review a tender offer without delaying in any way the com-
mencement of the offer. Thus, the Wisconsin statute directly
responds to the criticism which had previously been used to
strike down state takeover laws. In addition, the elimination
of fairness as a basis for denying registration places the Wis-
consin statute outside the judicial criticisms of statutes.
VII. CONCLUSION
The administrative rules promulgated by the SEC make
clear that state takeover laws are preempted by the Williams
Act. The "market approach" taken by the federal law leaves
no room for a fiduciary or "benevolent bureaucracy" ap-
proach. This is unfortunate due to the legitimate local inter-
ests present in state regulation.
Specifically, state approaches which are limited in jurisdic-
tional reach to the target's state of incorporation will probably
survive commerce clause objections. Additionally, while
precommencement or minimum period statutory provisions
clearly conflict with the federal law, those statutes which have
provisions for administrative review should be validated.
First, the regulation of securities has traditionally been one
where both the state and federal governments regulations are
supplementary. Second, the market approach as envisioned by
Congress restricts competition, and may not result in the best
possible price the market will bear for the stock. In this way,
the operative effect of the Williams Act results in a distinct
advantage to the raiding company. If it is full disclosure and
free flow of information that is sought, an opportunity to hear
competitors should be afforded to target shareholders. How-





ever, this can only be accomplished through Congressional ac-
tion, given the position of the SEC with regard to preemption,
coupled with the constraints of the judiciary in reviewing leg-
islative purpose. While the Wisconsin approach probably
avoids constitutional infirmity it is also a less useful tool for a
target corporation to use in avoiding a takeover. Perhaps, with
Congressional intervention, a legitimate state interest in pro-
tecting target corporations will be recognized.
DONALD W. LAYDEN, JR.
EDITOR'S NOTE: After this article was prepared for publication, two additional cases
were decided which affect the constitutionality of state takeover laws. In National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,299 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 30, 1981) the Missouri takeover statute was preempted. However, in Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Whaland, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,303 (N.H. July 2,
1981) the New Hampshire takeover statute withstood constitutional challenge.
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